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ON JUSTITIA, RACE, GENDER, AND BLINDNESS
I. Bennett Capers*
If there is one image we associate with justice-beyond the gallows
or the electric chair,' beyond robes in black,2 beyond Renaissance images
of the Last Judgment,' and beyond (notwithstanding recent efforts) the
Ten Commandments 4-it is of Justitia herself, blindfolded, balancing a
* Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra Law School. B.A. Princeton University; J.D.
Columbia Law School. Assistant United States Attorney 1995-2004. This Essay benefited
from presentation at the Law & Gender Colloquium at Hofstra Law School. This Essay
was also chosen for the Fall 2006 Distinguished Lecture at Hofstra University-I thank
the selection committee for choosing it-and benefited from the many thought-provoking
comments I received after the lecture. Finally, I owe a special thanks to Seth Michael For-
man of the School ofVisual Arts for reviewing each draft and opening my eyes to seeing
art in new ways.
1. I have discussed the electric chair imagery in particular in previous work. See
Bennett Capers, On Andy Warhol's Electric Chair, 94 CALI. L. REV. 243 (2006).
2. For a history of the robe, see Glenn W Ferguson, To Robe or Not to Robe? AJudi-
cial Dilemma, 19 J. oF THE AM. JUDICAUaRE Soc. 166-71 (1956). For a discussion of its
symbolism, see Charles M.Yablon,Judicial Drag: An Essay on Wigs, Robes and Legal Change,
1995 Wis. L. R-Ev. 1129 (1995); Pnina Lahav, Theater in the Courtroom: The Chicago Conspir-
acy Trial, 16 LAw & LIT. 381, 433 (2004).
3. As Samuel Edgerton has observed, the fundamental iconic image for represent-
ing the concept of law during the late Middle Ages was the Last Judgment, with scenes
arranged so that Last Judgments were likened to courts of law. One of the miniatures in
the Decretal in fact highlights the connection between heavenly and earthly justice. A
miniature painted by the fourteenth century artist Nicolo di Giacomo da Bologna con-
tains two horizontal registers: the upper register depicting the Last Judgment, with Christ
condemning sinners to hell; the lower register depicting an ecclesiastical court, with the
Pope banishing sinners to prison. Last Judgment images continued to proliferate after the
fourteenth century, and by the sixteenth century, Last Judgment paintings were the stan-
dard backdrop behind the judges' bench, at least in northern Europe. See SAMUEL Y
EDGERTON, JR., PICTURES AND PUNISHMENT: ART AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION DURING THE
FLORENTINE RENAISSANCE 21-58 (Cornell University Press 1985).
4. The Supreme Court recently decided two cases involving the display of the Ten
Commandments: McCreary County, Kentucky v. American Civil Liberties Union, 545 U.S. 844
(2005) (holding that displays of the Ten Commandments on courthouse grounds in Ken-
tucky violated the establishment clause where its purpose was to endorse religion) and Van
Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (holding that display of the Ten Commandments on
the grounds of the Texas' state capitol building did not violate the establishment clause
since the display was primarily historic rather than religious).To a certain extent, however,
these cases were overshadowed by the refusal of Alabama Supreme Court Justice Roy
Moore to remove a Ten Commandments monument from the rotunda of the Alabama
Supreme Court building. His refusal resulted in his removal from the bench, as well as a
judicial order from the Eleventh Circuit that the monument be removed. Glassroth v.
Moore, 347 F3d 916 (11th Cir. 2003). See also Ariel Hart, Alabama Justices Ouster Upheld in
Ten Commandments Case, N.Y TIMES, May 1, 2004, at A9; Chief Justice Roy Moore's Last
Stand, N.Y TIMES, Aug. 28, 2003, at A30.
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
scale in one hand, brandishing an unsheathed sword in the other. Indeed,
the image is so ubiquitous-in courthouses, on law books, in law
schools'-and so ingrained in our collective consciousness, that it has the
weight of a given.Too often we are beyond noticing it, beyond seeing it.
This Essay is about seeing Justitia. Except already I need a clarifica-
tion. In fact, this Essay is about looking beyond the easy attributes: the
scales that suggest a careful weighing of facts; the sword that suggests the
threat of swift force behind the law's judgment, what Robert Cover so
aptly identified as law's violence.
6
Rather, this Essay, like my gaze, focuses on Justitia's more problem-
atic attributes. Like Justitia's blindfold, which has been described as "the
most enigmatic" of her traits. 7 Is the blindfold merely emblematic ofJusti-
tia's purported impartiality, her claim to algorithmic justice?' As law
5. For example, statues of Justitia can be found at the Sofia Court of Justice, the
Brussels Palais de Justice, the Louvre, the Palace of Westminster, Old Bailey in London,
France City Hall, the Munich Residenz Museum, the Santa Maria del Popolo Church in
Rome, the Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam, the faqade of the U.S. Capitol and, of course, the
Supreme Court building in Washington, D.C.
6. See Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986); see also Jacque
Derrida, Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority," in DECONSTRUCTION AND THE
POSSmILITY Or JUSTICE (Drucilla Cornel, Michel Rosenfeld, and David Gray Carlson, eds.,
Roudedge 1992) ("Applicability, 'enforceability,' is not an exterior or secondary possibility
that may or may not be added as a supplement to law. It is the force essentially implied in
the very concept ofjustice as law."). As another commentator has put it:
Justice ... in one hand, holds the scales, in which she weighs the right, car-
ries in the other the sword with which she executes it. The sword without
the scales is brute force, the scales without the sword is the impotence of the
law. The scales and the sword belong together, and the state of the law is per-
fect, only where the power with which Justice carries the sword is equaled
by the skill with which she holds the scales.
RUDOLPH VON IHERING, THE STRUGGLE FOR LAW 1-2 (Chicago: Callaghan and Company
1879).
7. See Martin Jay, Must Justice Be Blind? in LAw AND THE IMAGE 19 (Costas Douzi-
nas and Lynda Nead, eds., 1999) (quoting and translating Robert Jacob, "Images de la
justice; Essai sue l'iconographie judiciare du Moyen Age a l'age classique" (1994)). Robert
Cover made a similar point in Procedure. See R. COVER, O. Fiss, & J. RESNICK, PROCEDURE
Ch. 5:
There is a critical ambiguity to the blindfold of Justice-which no end of
explanation in terms of 'impartiality' can illuminate. Sure Justice is blind-
folded so that she may be impartial, but just as sure her blindfold cannot
function on that level alone .... the richness of the concreteness of our icon
lies in its incapacity to be reduced 'merely' to an idea like impartiality.
Id.
8. See Alan Wolfe, Algorithmic Justice, in DECONSTRUCTION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF
JUSTICE 361, 366 (Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld, and David Gray Carlson, eds.,
Routledge 1992) (describing "algorithmic justice" as involving the blind adherence to
binding rules and precedent).
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professor Costas Douzinas and art historian Lynda Nead have asked, does
the blindfold enable Justitia "to avoid the temptation to see the face that
comes to the law and put the unique characteristics of the concrete per-
son before the abstract logic of the institution"? 9 Or does the blindfold
signify something more, a second sight of sorts? Maybe that Justitia, un-
able to see, becomes, like Sophocles' Teiresias, a seer? That Justitia, lacking
sight, obtains insight? I am indebted to the French scholar M. Petitjean for
yet a third possibility: that the blindfold functions as a limiting principle,
reminding Justitia that she should tread cautiously, slowly, always cognizant
of the step that came before."° Cass Sunstein, a proponent of judicial
minimalism, should appreciate that one."
Except when I consider these readings of Justitia's blindfold, I know
that something is missing. Or at least in my case. This is because when I
linger in front ofJustitia, I linger not just as a law professor and an icono-
phile-as Judith Resnik and Dennis Curtis did two decades ago in their
Yale Law Journal essay "Images ofJustice"' 2-but also as a black law profes-
sor, a black iconophile. My position in looking up to Justitia-looking up,
since Justitia is normally situated on a pedestal, cast larger than life' 3-- is
necessarily, if unfortunately, different. Rather than a distinct male gaze'4 or
9. See Costas Douzinas & Lynda Nead, Introduction, in LAW AND THE IMAGE 3 (Co-
stas Douzinas and Lynda Nead, eds.,The University of Chicago Press 1999).
10. See M. Petitjean, Un homme de loi semurois: L'avocat P Lemulier, in ANNALES DE
BOURGOGNE 57:245 (cited in Martin Jay, Must Justice Be Blind? in LAw AND THE IMAGE 32
(Costas Douzinas and Lynda Nead, eds., The University of Chicago Press 1999).
11. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SU-
PREME COURT 4 (Harvard University Press 1999).
12. See Dennis E. Curtis &Judith Resnik, Images ofJustice, 96 YALE L.J. 1727 (1987).
13. Id. at 1741 ("For much of the Western world's history, Justice has been depicted
as a large female figure.").
14. "The male gaze" comes from Laura Mulvey's highly influential essay on male
spectatorship, and describes not only the pleasure male viewers receive when viewing
women on film, but also the concept that giving men pleasure is one of the functions of
imagery. See Laura Mulvey, Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema, in ART AFrER MODERNISM:
RETHINKING REPRESENTATION 361, 366 (B.Wallis, ed., 1988). Not surprisingly, the concept
is also frequently used in discussing Western art and the prevalence of the female nude. For
example, in the seminal Ways of Seeing,John Berger contends that "Women are depicted in
a quite different way from men-not because the feminine is different from the mascu-
line-but because the 'ideal' spectator is always assumed to be male and the image of the
woman is designed to flatter him." JOHN BERGER, WAYS OF SEEING 64 (British Broadcasting
Corporation 1972).
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female gaze,' 5 or even a dominant gaze, 16 I have what can be described as
a black gaze.17
Suddenly, Justitia's blindness becomes more complex, and to my
mind, more problematic. After all, what does it mean, connotatively and
denotatively, for Justitia to be blind in a society where color is so deter-
minative? And given that defendants in our criminal justice system are
disproportionately underprivileged men of color,"8 another question must
be asked: What do they see when they this metonymic image we call Justi-
tia, and what are the consequences (to "them," to "us") of this
confrontation? Put differently, what does it mean for Justitia to be figured
not only as blind, but as white and female? To many this may seem like an
idle question, something to while away the time. After all, the response
might go, it's only an image. One goal of this Essay is to convince readers
otherwise. After all, so much of actual justice depends on how justice is
perceived.
And hence this highly personal, hopefully engaging Essay, which I
think of not so much as an argument but as a journey. My hegira. And to
encourage the reader to stay along for the ride, here's a roadmap. In Part I,
I begin by tracing the historical origins of our present day Justitia, discuss-
ing the power of imagery, and posing the question of how we view her
"most enigmatic" attribute, blindness. In Part II, I continue the discussion
by considering how blindness plays out in criminal cases in general, from
selecting a jury to executing capital defendants. In Part III, I go a step fur-
ther, focusing on the Supreme Court's blindness as to matters of race in a
series of Fourth Amendment cases. In Part IV, I shift the focus from Justi-
15. See, for example, the essays collected in ThE FEMALE GAZE: WOMEN AS VIEWERS
OF PoPULAR CuLTuRE (Lorraine Gamman and Margaret Marshment, eds., The Women's
Press Ltd. 1989), which attempt to situate the traditionally excluded female viewer and
also stress the importance of gazes between female figures.
16. See Margaret M. Russell, Race and the Dominant Gaze: Narratives of Law and Ine-
quality in Popular Film, 15 LEGAL STUDIES FORUM 243 (1991).
17. In invoking a black gaze, I am indebted to two fairly recent collections of art
theory: RACE-ING ART HISTORY: CRITICAL READINGS IN RACE AND ART HISTORY (Kymberly
N. Pinder, ed., Routledge 2002) and WITH OTER EYEs: LOOKING AT RACE & GENDER IN
VisuAL CuLTtrE (Lisa Bloom, ed. 1999). I am also indebted to the work of cultural theo-
rist bell hooks and film theorist Manthia Diawara. See EELL HOOKS, BLACK LOOKS: RACE &
REPRESENTATION (1992); Manthia Diawara, Black Spectatorship: Problems of Identification and
Resistance, 29 No. 4. SCREEN 66 (1988). I am not suggesting that spectators do not call
upon a multiplicity of gazes depending on the image, or that these gazes are exhaustive. I
am suggesting that these terms are useful in discussing idealized spectatorial positions.
18. As the Sentencing Project has recently noted, "black males born today have a
one in three chance of going to prison during their lifetime, as opposed to a one in seven-
teen chance for white males." See Racial Disparity http://www.sentencingproject.org/
issues_07.ctm. One in every eight black men in his twenties is in prison or jail. Id. "These
trends have been exacerbated by the impact of the 'war on drugs,' with three-fourths of all
drug offenders being persons of color, far out of proportion to their share of drug users in
society." Id.
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tia's blindness to her other attributes, namely, her race and her gender. In
doing so, I ask what it means to look through the prism of a black male
gaze at an image ofjustice that has been figured as white and female. Fi-
nally, in PartV, I suggest that maybe,just maybe, it is time for us to create a
new image ofjustice.
In one respect, my goal is a modest one: to draw on law, art history,
literature, and cultural studies to explore the meanings of Justitia, to see
how that meaning functions, and to examine whom that meaning serves.
In another respect, my goal is an ambitious one: to open the floor, if you
will, for a larger and more inclusive discussion about the dialogic interplay
between art and law, to spur a legal iconology. And in one final respect,
my goal is more ambitious still. The art historian James Elkins has stated
that "seeing alters the thing that is seen and transforms the seer. Seeing is
metamorphosis, not mechanism."19 And that is my wish in this Essay. That
in pausing to linger, we, unlike Justitia, will see. And that in seeing, under-
standing, we too will be transformed.
I.
First, a confession.
I knew little of Justitia's genealogy when I began this project. I did
not know, for example, that her origins are traceable to the Greek goddess
Themis, one of the original Titans, the Elder Gods created at the begin-
ning of time by heaven and earth.20 There, sitting at Zeus's side, Themis
was responsible for convoking and dissolving the Agora, the deliberative
assembly on the authority of Zeus.21 As mythologist J. Harrison observed,
Zeus himself could not summon his own assembly. Rather, he had to "bid
Themis call the gods to counsel from many-folded Olympus' brow."
2
19. JAMES ELKINS, THE OBJECT STARES BACK: ON THE NATURE OF SEEING 11-12
(Simon & Schuster 1996). Elkins explains:
An image is not a piece of data in an information system. It is a corrosive,
something that has the potential to tunnel into me, to melt part of what I am
and re-form it in another shape. Some things in me are different because of
that image, and that means-if I am willing to let down my guard and be
honest about how this works-that I am not the same person as I was before.
Id. at 42-43.
20. See generally EDITi-i HAMILTON, MYTHOLOGY: TIMELESS TALES OF GODS & HEROES
24-25 (Little Brown and Company 1940; HUGH LLOYD-JONES, THE JUSTICE OF ZEUS 50
(University of California Press 1971); HELEN E NORTH, FROM MYTH TO ICON: REFLEC-
TIONS OF GREEK ETHICAL DOCTRINE IN LITERATURE & ART (Cornell University Press 1979)
and Cathleen Burnett, Justice: Myth and Symbol, LEGAL STUDIES FORUM, Vol. XI, No. 1
(1987) at 1.
21. ERIc A. HAVELOCK, THE GREEK CONCEPT OF JUSTICE 101 (Harvard University
Press 1978).
22. JANE E. HARRISON, EPILEGOMENA AND T isEMs 482 (University Books 1962).
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Thernis thus became associated with the process that "brings and binds
men together,"23 the maintenance of a certain order, and shared and con-
tinuing principles of law, what we today might describe as precedent.2"
And the Greek word "themis" came to mean "the custom," and was ap-
plied to decrees, ordinances, and precepts of learned men.21 I also learned
that Justitia has another Greek forebear: Dike, the daughter of Themis and
Zeus.26 Occupying the seat on Zeus's other side, Dike was responsible for
administering justice. Perhaps not surprisingly, Dike is associated with the
procedures created to effect the implementation of justice.2 And the
Greek word "dike"? It's related to decisions.28
When I began this project, I was also unaware of Justitia's Egyptian
forebear, the goddess Ma'at, from whose name derives the word magis-
trate.29 Like our current day Justitia, Ma'at carried a sword (as well as a
feather), and determined justice, law and order, as well as the fate of the
dead.30 And as several Egyptian papyrus scrolls reveal, Ma'at used a scale.
For example, in the painted scene "Judgment Before Osiris" from the
Book of the Dead of Hunefer (c. 1275 BCE), the goddess Ma'at appears atop
of a scale in the "Hall of Two Truths" while the god Thoth, revered as the
inventor of hieroglyphic writing, functions as a sort of court stenogra-
pher.31 A heart, representing the deceased Hunefer, appears on one dish of
the scale, while Ma'at's feather, representing truth and justice, appears on
the other. The slightest turning of the scale, the image suggests, will dic-
tate whether Hunefer will join Osiris, King of the Blessed, or be
devoured by Anmit, the dreaded "Eater of the Dead. '32
And then there's the third source for Justitia: St. Michael, one of the
seven archangels named in the New Testament, and the one tasked with
23. Id. at 485.
24. HAVELOCK, supra note 21, at 136 (1978).
25. John W Heckel & Kathleen G. Farmann, Questions and Answers, 52 LAw LIER. J.
232,234 (1959).
26. As Zeus's consort, Themis bore him several children representing distinct aspects
of order, of which Dike is the most well known. Cathleen Burnett,Justice: Myth & Symbol,
LEGAL STUDIES FORUM, Vol. X1, No. 1 (1987), at 81.
27. Id. at 82-83.
28. See FE. PETERS, GREEK PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS: A HISTORICAL LEXICON 38-40
(1967); see also R.V.D. Magoffin, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REvIEw,Vol. 3, No. 2
(May, 1909), pp. 284, 286 (reviewing RUDOLPH HIRZEL, THEMIs, DIKE uND VERWANDTES.
EIN BEITRAG zUR GESCHICHTE DER RECHTSIDEE BEI DEN GRIECHEN (1907)).
29. Legal Symbols of the Anglo-American Tradition, WEST'S GUIDE TO AMERICAN LAW,
Vol. II,Appendix D., p. 687 (1983).
30. Id.
31. R.O. FAULKNER,THE ANCIENT EGYPTIAN BOOK OF THE DEAD (revised ed. C.A..
Andrews) (1985).
32. Id. See also David Daube, The Scales ofJustice, 63 JURID. REv. 109, 113 (1951).The
next register informs the viewer that Hunefer has passed the test; he is presented to Osiris.
In the top register, Hunefer appears in the afterlife, kneeling before the nine gods of
Heliopolis.
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calling forth, receiving, and judging released souls on Judgment Day.33
Here I was on firmer ground, given my familiarity with Last Judgment
paintings, many of which depict St. Michael with a sword or with scales.
Jan van Eyck's Last Judgment (c. 1430), Rogier van der Weyden's Beunne
Alterpiece (c. 1450), Hans Memling's The Last Judgment (c. 1472),Joos van
Cleve's The Last Judgment (ca. 1520), and Tintoretto's Last Judgment (c.
1558) come to mind. Still, I was learning. Perhaps because Justitia is usu-
ally blindfolded, whereas St. Michael is always sighted, the connection had
escaped me. There's even a little known painting showing the two to-
gether. In Jacobello del Fiore's Justice Between the Archangels Michael and
Gabriel (c. 1421), which originally hung in the chamber of the Magistrato
del Proprio at the Palazzo Ducale, Justitia sits in the central panel, while
St. Michael appears in the panel to her left. Both hold a pair of scales.
Both brandish an unsheathed sword.34
This is not to suggest that I came to this project completely unin-
formed. What I knew was that images are powerful, visceral, and often
polemical. As evidence, one has only to consider the face that launched a
thousand ships, or the face that recently launched over a hundred thou-
sand rioters in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Syria, Somalia, Pakistan, Nigeria,31 to
say nothing of the iconoclasm that spurred the Reformation. "Images are
sensual and fleshy; they address the labile elements of the self, they speak
to the emotions, and they organize the unconscious. They have the power
to short-circuit reason and enter the soul without the interpolation or
intervention of language or interpretation. 36 Or as art historian Pierre
Legendre has put it, images help bind the biological, unconscious, and
social parts of the person.33 At the same time, every image is specular,
stares back, tells us something about ourselves. Art historian W.J.T.
Mitchell observed as much in his Iconology:
33. This is not to suggest that Saint Michael is the only saint associated with Justitia.
In fact, early Latin Christians also associated the Virgin Mary with Justitia, since the Virgin
Mary was often depicted as the intercessor for human souls at the Last Judgment, as in Fra
Angelico's Last Judgment (c.1440). See SAMUEL Y EDGERTON, JR., PICTURES AND PUNISH-
MENT:ART AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION DURING THE FLORENTINE RENAISSANCE 38 (1985).
34. For a lengthier discussion of this painting, see GIOvANNA SCIRE NEPI, TREASURES
OF VENETIAN PAINTING: TiHE GALLERIE DELL'AcCADEMIA 42-43 (The Vendome Press tran.
1991).
35. The riots were in response to 12 caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad first
published in Denmark's Jyllands-Posten in September 2005 and reprinted in several Euro-
pean newspapers in February 2006. Within weeks, well over a hundred deaths had been
attributed to protests over the caricatures. See Lydia Polgreen, Nigeria Counts 100 Deaths
Over Danish Caricatures, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2006, at A8; Carlotta Gall, Muslim Protests
Against Cartoon Spread, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 6, 2006, at A8.
36. See Douzinas & Nead, supra note 9.
37. Pierre Legendre, Introduction to the Theory of the Image: Narcissus and the Other in
the Mirror 8 LAw & CRITIQUE 3, 5, 10-16 (1997) (trans. Peter Goodrich & Alain Pottage).
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Images are not just a particular kind of sign, but something like
an actor on the historical stage, a presence or character en-
dowed with legendary status, a history that parallels and
participates in the stories we tell ourselves about our own evo-
lution from creatures "made in the image" of a creator, to
creatures who make themselves and their world in their own
image."
And I knew that Justitia is blind. And this is what intrigued me more
than anything. After all, do we truly associate blindness with anything
good? Even when we think of love and blindness, we see the blindness as
a limitation; we snicker that "the lover is blinded about what he loves so
that he judges wrongly the just, the good and the honourable."3 Or we
associate blindness with an impurity, as art historian Erwin Panofsky ob-
served in discussing Justitia in his Studies in Iconology:
Whether the expression caecus is interpreted as 'unable to see'
(blind in the narrower sense, physically or mentally) or as 'in-
capable of being seen' (hidden, secret, invisible) or as
'preventing the eye from seeing' (dark, lightless, black): blind-
ness 'conveys to us only something negative and nothing
positive, and by the blind man we generally understand the
sinner" to speak in the words of a mediaeval moralist.4"
The negative connotations we associate with blindness go beyond
this. One thinks of the condemned, blindfolded and awaiting execution
by firing squad. There is something disturbing about blindness, something
we fear. Consider the narrator in Raymond Carver's short story "Cathe-
dral" who dreads having to pass the evening with a blind man.4" Or
38. WT.J. MITCHELL, ICONOLOGY: IMAGE, TEXT, IDEOLOGY 9 (University of Chicago
Press 1986).
39. 5 LEGES PLATO V, THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 113, (B. Jowett trans., Oxford Uni-
versity Press 3 ed. 1892). In his discussion of the visualization of love as blind, Erwin
Panofsky notes:
Cupid is nude and blind because he 'deprives men of their garments, their
possessions, their good sense and their wisdom.' He is blind 'because he does
not mind where he turns, inasmuch as love descends upon the poor as well
as the rich, the ugly as well as the handsome. He is also called blind because
people are blinded by him, for nothing is blinder than a man influenced by
love for a person or a thing.'
ERWIN PANOFSKY, STUDIES IN ICONOLOGY: HUMANISTIC THEMES IN THE ART OF THE RENAIS-
sANcE 95, 107-08 (1939, 1972).
40. Id. at 95-109.
41. Carver's narrator explains:"[H]is being blind bothered me. My idea of blindness
came from the movies. In the movies, the blind moved slowly and never laughed. Some-
times they were led by seeing-eye dogs. A blind man in my house was not something I
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consider Nobel Prize winner Jos& Saramago's harrowing novel Blindness,
in which a city is hit by an epidemic of "white blindness."4 The city re-
sponds not with compassion, but with unmitigated terror, quarantining
the blind in an abandoned asylum while armed guards patrol the perime-
ter to make sure none escape. The novel is anything but easy, with its
scenes of the blind urinating and defecating in the hallways of the asylum,
unable to find lavatories, or fighting over the inadequate rations of food
the soldiers leave by the gate each day; with its scenes of soldiers shooting
the blind who, unable to see, wander too close to the gate; and when fac-
tions are formed to wield control over the limited food rations, with the
novel's graphic scenes of gang rape and torture. Tellingly, it is the one
sighted inhabitant, who feigned blindness so that she could remain at her
blind husband's side, who alone is able to administer justice (by stabbing
the lead rapist in the throat with a pair of scissors), and thus restore justice.
And despite our rhetoric about blindness signifying impartiality, the
fact is that even when it comes to actually judging, we have seen blind-
ness as a defect. How else can we explain the concerns raised when the
Honorable Richard Casey, who happens to be blind, was nominated to
the federal bench in 1992?43 Luckily, those concerns were allayed.
Which brings me to my favorite Bruegel drawing, hisJustitia (1559).
On a pedestal in the foreground stands Justice personified, properly blind-
folded, sword in one hand, scales in the other. It's only when the viewer
looks beyond the foreground that the viewer notices the surrounding tor-
ture, the surrounding cruelty: the penitent being beheaded, the man
strapped to a bench while boiling liquid is poured down his throat, the
persons tied to wheels, while others hang from gallows, the person
hanged by his bound ankles and wrists." All in the name ofJustice.
Isn't this what we think of when we think of blindness?
II.
The more I began to think about Justitia's blindness, the more I saw
blindness everywhere, especially in the criminal arena, with which I am
most familiar. The trope of blindness permeates the process, at least
looked forward to." Raymond Carver, Cathedral, in WHERE I'M CALLING FROM: SELECTED
SHORT STORIES 356 (1989).
42. Josf SARAMAGO, BLINDNESS (trans. Giovanni Pontiero) (1997).
43. A Blind Judge, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 6, 1992, at A22 ("Even in this age of increased
opportunities for the disabled, the Senator's candidate, Richard Casey, pushed the outer
boundaries of what the judicial system can accommodate .... The ability to make eye
contact has almost universally been assumed indispensable for the task of trial judging.");
see also Lynda Richardson, Lawyer Wio Is Blind Is Recommended To Be Federal Judge, N.Y
TIMES, Feb. 2, 1992, at B6.
44. For an interesting discussion of this drawing, see LIONELLO PupPI, TORMENT IN
ART: PAIN,VIOLENCE AND MARTYRDOM 15 (1991).
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notionally. Juries used to be comprised of a defendant's peers."a Now, we
insist on jurors who are anything but the defendant's peers, excluding
those who know the defendant, or the defendant's family, or the defen-
dant's neighborhood. And that is only the beginning. We exclude those
who know anything about the crime itself, about where the crime was
committed, about the victim, or the victim's family. And lest some vision
still remain, we exclude venire persons who know the prosecutor, the de-
fense attorney, the judge.
From there the enforced blindness continues. The evidence juries
are permitted to consider is based more on rules of exclusion rather than
inclusion. Evidence that would tend to provide explanation or context is
deemed irrelevant, or non-probative. We stick to this line so strongly that
we banish any juror who so much as mentions extraneous evidence. And
if that doesn't remedy the problem, we declare a mistrial. Because we in-
sist. We tell ourselves the judge can factor this all in at sentencing. For
now, it should be the blind leading the blind.
Indeed, the contrast between what information jurors are permitted
to know and what information is excluded becomes most glaring in capi-
tal cases. There, the capital phase allows the jurors to see evidence that was
previously excluded. This is true of mitigating evidence. That the defen-
dant's mother was a crack addict and that, between the ages of seven and
ten, he was raped repeatedly by one of her successive boyfriends. That
though not mentally retarded, at least not enough to insulate him from
execution under Atkins v. Virginia,46 he is on the borderline. That he has
been repeatedly diagnosed as psychotic. And this is true of aggravating
evidence. No, this was not his first arrest. No, this was not even his first
murder. And did we mention the prior rape convictions? Only in these
few capital cases, however, do we allow this fuller image to emerge. Only
after we've secured a guilty verdict in the guilt phase. Only when the
concept of innocence or even juror nullification has been removed from
the table, only when the only option left is life imprisonment, or death.
Only then do we begin to lift the veil. When we choose death, we con-
tinue our enforcement of blindness. It used to be that in death by firing
squad, the defendant awaiting execution would be blindfolded. But the
blindness went both ways. The defendant was blindfolded, and thus
45. As Lawrence Friedman has observed, jurors were not supposed to be "impartial,
unaware, blank pages," but rather community men with "a keen knowledge of the good
and rotten apples in their barrel." LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME & PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 26-27 (1993). For example, an early Virginia law drew a clear prefer-
ence for jurors familiar with the case, stating that jurors should be drawn from "thence
who by reason of their neere acquaintance with the business may give information of
diverse circumstances to the rest of the jury." WW HENING, STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIR-
GINIA,Vol. 2, p. 63.
46. 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (overruling its prior decision in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302 (1989) and holding that the Eighth Amendment bars the execution of the mentally
retarded).
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couldn't see his shooter, but the shooters too were blind in a way. Because
there were several shooters firing at once, they could remain blind to who
fired the fatal shot. 4' This double blindness exists even where death is by gas,
by lethal injection, or by electric chair. And that is because responsibility for
state-imposed death is always diffused, from the prosecutor to the jurors to
the sentencing judge to the appellate courts to the executive to the war-
den. 48 A system so perfect that not one of the participants ever has to look
in a mirror and see a killer. An execution without an executioner.
Either way-in capital cases or in non-capital cases-the defendants
are banished from our sight entirely49 They are removed from view, placed
behind cinder block walls, rendered invisible but for the occasional riot or
escape, or the salacious prisoner's rights case, such as the inmate alleging
that he was repeatedly gang raped,"0 or the Jewish inmate suing to be clas-
sified as "non-white other."' Aside from these brief incursions into our
consciousness, the condemned remain invisible, reduced to mere numbers,
and we remain blindly indifferent. For anyone who doubts this, just con-
sider the numbers. The U.S. prison and jail population is well over 2
million.12 In terms of people, this is more than the population of
47. We even armed one of the firing squad members with a blank round, further
insulating each shooter from responsibility.
48. Craig Haney has argued that this distance is not accidental, but part of an elabo-
rate system to ensure that citizens continue to sanction executions. See Craig Haney,
Violence and the Capital Jury: Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement and the Impulse to Condemn
to Death, 49 STAN. L. Rav. 1447, 1449 (1997). Professor Markus Dubber makes a similar
observation:
Viewed in its complex entirety, the modern system of capital punishment
appears as one mad and futile scramble to deny personal responsibility for
the necessarily violent aspect of law. It is the system of capital punishment
that inflicts the pain of its punishment, not any of its members. If a particular
member of the system is to be held responsible for the system's acts, it is al-
ways someone else, someone earlier, and someone elsewhere.
Markus Dirk Dubber, The Pain of Punishment, 44 BuFF. L. REv. 545,605-06 (1996).
49. This is not to say that inmates are invisible inside the prison. There, they are
always under surveillance, as Foucault pointed out in his exegesis of the penitentiary as
panopticon. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 280
(Alan Sheridan, trans. 1977). My point, rather, is that they are invisible from outside of the
prison.
50. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Inmate Was Considered 'Property' of Gang, Witness Tells Jury in
Prison Lawsuit, N.Y TIMES, Sept. 25, 2005, at Al (discussing case of Roderick Johnson who
sued Texas prison system for turning a blind eye to the repeated rapes he endured as an
inmate); Sexual Slavery in Prison, N.YTIMES, Oct. 12, 2005, at A22 (same).
51. See, e.g., Phillip Martin, Jewish Inmate Seeks Segregation From Anti-Semitic Gangs,
NPR's ALL THINGS CONSIDERED, Nov. 6, 2005 ("A Jewish inmate at California's San
Quentin prison says his life is in danger because he's being housed with other white in-
mates, many of whom belong to anti-Semitic white supremacist gangs. The inmate is
asking the prison to reclassify him from "White" to "Other.").
52. Bureau ofJustice Statistics, Prisoners in 2004 (U.S. Dep't ofJustice).
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Delaware, more than the population of New Hampshire, more than the
population of Wyoming, more than the population ofVermont. To men-
tion nothing of minority communities, where as many as 10% of all males
age 25 to 29 are now behind bars. 3 Just imagine if a tenth of the young
males you knew were no longer present, no longer reachable. Is it any
wonder that advocates who lobby against New York's Rockefeller Drug
Laws refer to themselves as Mothers of the NewYork Disappeared? 4
We are especially proud of our professed blindness when it comes to
race, perhaps the most meaningful and meaningless visual attribute there
is. With Batson v. Kentucky,55 we prohibited prosecutors from using race in
selecting jurors. We instruct jurors not to consider race. Indeed, we reverse
for a new trial if the judge fails to so instruct. We tell prosecutors not to
make appeals to race, again reversing if they do. And if it is discovered that
race played a role in deliberations, we reverse for a new trial. So we blind
ourselves to issues of race. Indeed, we determined that race was so prob-
lematic that we created "reverse Batson," prohibiting defense lawyers from
striking jurors based on race. 6 Never mind that our history is all about
race. That until recently, blacks were routinely excluded from jury service.
And continue to be excluded, as we were forced to acknowledge just a
few years ago in Miller-El v. Dretke.s7 Never mind that until recently,
prosecutors routinely appealed to race, and that jurors still consider race.
For evidence, one only has to think of the racial disparities in capital sen-
tencing that were brought to the Supreme Court's attention, to no avail,
in McKleskey v. Kemp."8 Or of the social cognition research showing the
53. See http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1044.pdf.
54. For more on this organization, see http://www.nymom.org (last visited Febru-
ary 12, 2006).
55. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
56. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
57. 545 U.S. 231 (2005) (granting habeas relief to a black death-row inmate after
concluding that prosecutors had engaged in purposeful discrimination in using their per-
emptory challenges to excuse ten of eleven black venirepersons, and noting "the general
pohcy of the Dallas County District Attorney's Office to exclude black venire members
from juries").
58. 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (declining to invalidate a Georgia death penalty statute on
constitutional grounds despite statistical evidence demonstrating that, in Georgia, the im-
position of death often strongly correlated with the race of the defendant and the race of
the victim because the racial discrepancies did "not demonstrate a constitutionally signifi-
cant risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia capital sentencing process."). See also Randall
L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101
HtAiv. L. REv. 1388, 1411-13 (1988) (noting the seeming indifference of the Supreme
Court to the continuing pervasiveness of racism in the administration of criminal justice)
and SAMUEL R. GRoss and ROBERT MAuRO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARI-
TIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING 110 (1989). A more recent study found that in Maryland,
while victims in capital cases between 1978 and 1999 were roughly evenly split, in 80% of
the cases where the death penalty was imposed, the victim was white. Adam Liptak, Death
Penalty Found More Likely When Victim is White, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2003, at A12.
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pervasiveness of implicit racial biases.5 9 Despite all of this, we maintain the
fiction. That the jury was colorblind. That justice was served. That blind-
ness is justice.
III.
It just so happens that as I was researching Justitia's genealogy, I was
also rereading Fourth Amendment cases. And maybe because I was think-
ing about blindness, I was suddenly struck by the repeated elisions and
displacements in matters of race in the cases I read. Consider the solecism
in the following passage from Oliveira v. Mayer,6" a civil rights action alleg-
ing wrongful arrest:
On January 4, 1991, a private motorist spotted the plaintiffs,
three dark-skinned males, handling an expensive video camera
while driving a dilapidated station wagon through an affluent
area of North Stamford, Connecticut. Suspicious merely be-
cause the camera appeared quite valuable and because the
vehicle had New York license plates and had emerged from a
dead-end street, the motorist called the police from his car
phone and reported that there may have been a burglary.6
Merely? Isn't this just selective blindness recast as a shell game of
now you see it, now you don't? In referring to the males as "dark-
skinned," and yet omitting their color in listing the factors that likely trig-
gered the complainant's suspicion, isn't the Second Circuit both revealing
race and concealing race, revealing it as a factor, concealing its relevance?
Or consider Justice Scalia's opinion in Whren v. United States,62 which
held that pretext stops, i.e., stops for minor offenses in the hope that evi-
dence of a more serious offense will be revealed, do not violate the
Fourth Amendment. In describing the facts of the case,Justice Scalia states
that plainclothes vice-squad officers became suspicious when they spotted
a dark Pathfinder truck with temporary plates "and youthful occupants"
waiting at a stop sign, and observed the driver looking down into the lap
of the passenger at his right. Seeing the driver later turn without signaling
and drive away "at an 'unreasonable' speed," the officers pulled alongside
the Pathfinder and ordered the driver to park. An officer then approached
59. See, e.g.,Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HAsv. L. Rv. 1489, 1490-1539
(2005) (charting the social science data and examining the reification of biases through the
media); Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom: Perceptions of
Guilt and Dispositional Attributions, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULLETIN 1367 (2000).
60. 23 E3d 642,644 (2d Cir. 1994).
61. Id. at 644 (emphasis added).
62. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
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the Pathfinder on foot and "immediately observed two large plastic bags
of what appeared to be crack cocaine in petitioner Whren's hands. 63
Not surprisingly, Whren and the other occupants challenged the le-
gality of the stop, arguing that the officers' asserted ground for approaching
them-to give them a warning concerning a traffic violation-was pretex-
tual. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, rejected this argument, essentially
concluding that officers are permitted to engage in pretext stops, whatever
their ulterior motives, so long as they have reasonable suspicion or probable
cause to conduct a stop. What interests me about his opinion, however, is
the way he, like the Second Circuit in Oliveira, both concealed and revealed
race. Reading his recitation of the facts, one could think the occupants of
the vehicle were colorless, or that the officers were colorblind. It is not until
several lengthy paragraphs later that Justice Scalia mentions that the peti-
tioners are black, and even here, he is able to profess a type of blindness by
mentioning race solely in the context of stating the petitioners' argument:
"Petitioners, who are both black, further contend that police officers might
decide which motorists to stop based on decidedly impermissible factors,
such as the race of the car's occupants."64 Justice Scalia thus presents race as
a double afterthought: as an afterthought of the petitioners to buttress their
presumably weak claim, and as an afterthought that occurred to him only
upon the petitioners' bringing race to his attention. Oh, you're black. We
hadn't noticed. And as if to reemphasize the Court's professed colorblindness,
Justice Scalia never mentions the race of the defendants again, nor the role
it might have played in the officers' decision to conduct a pretext stop other
than to inform the petitioners that the "basis for objecting to intentionally
discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the
Fourth Amendment" But of course the concealment of race is little more
than legerdemain, and transparent at that, especially since the concealment
isn't even internally consistent. Justice Scalia repeatedly races the officer
who allegedly sees the crack cocaine by repeating his name--Officer Eph-
raim Soto6 -while omitting the names or providing any description of the
other plainclothes vice-squad officers. The strategy is clear: Race was not a
factor here.We do not even notice race. Honestly.Just ask the Hispanic cop.
I began to realize that this blindness impacts not only the way courts
write (or do not write) about race, but also the way courts think (or do
not think) about race. Here's another Fourth Amendment example: the
Supreme Court's "free to leave" test, first announced in US. v.
Mendenhal6 and elaborated upon in INS v. Delgado,67 Florida v. Bostick,6
63. Id. at 808-09.
64. Id. at 810.
65. Justice Scalia refers to Officer Soto by name a total of five times.
66. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
67. 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
68. 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
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and US. v. Drayton.69 In each of these cases, the Supreme Court was con-
fronted with whether a limited detention had occurred requiring
reasonable suspicion.
In US. v. Mendenhall, DEA agents observed Sylvia Mendenhall as she
was walking through the concourse at the Detroit Airport and, conclud-
ing that she met several of the profile characteristics of a drug courier,"0
asked to see her identification and airline ticket. Ms. Mendenhall willingly
complied--she had just arrived on a flight from Los Angeles and was en
route to a connecting flight-but because the name on the ticket and the
identification did not match, and because, according to one of the agents,
she seemed "quite shaken, extremely nervous,"' the agents asked her to
accompany them to the airport DEA office for further questioning. There,
the agents asked if they could search her handbag. She consented. They
asked if they could search her person. She consented. They asked if they
could conduct a strip search. She said she had a plane to catch. They said
if she did not have any narcotics, there wouldn't be a problem. So she
stripped. She removed packages of heroin from her undergarments and
handed them to an agent. She was prosecuted and convicted. Here's the
rub. There was no dispute that, when the officers approached Ms.
Mendenhall, they lacked probable cause to arrest her. And before the Su-
preme Court, the Government denied that there had even been a limited
detention requiring reasonable suspicion pursuant to Terry v. Ohio.72 The
Government argued instead that Mendenhall was never detained, that she
was always "free to leave."73 They argued that during the entire time she
was questioned by the agents, the entire time she was in the DEA office,
the entire time she was removing her clothes, it was consensual. The
Court essentially agreed. Since "a reasonable person" would have felt free
to leave, her consent to the search was not the product of detention .re-
quiring either reasonable suspicion or probable cause.
74
69. 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
70. 446 U.S. at 547 and n.l.The agent testified that he found four factors relevant:
(1) [T]he respondent was arriving on a flight from Los Angeles, a city be-
lieved by the agents to be a place of origin for much of the heroin brought
into Detroit; (2) the respondent was the last person to leave the plane, "ap-
peared to be nervous," and "completely scanned the whole area where [the
agents] were standing"; (3) after leaving the plane the respondent proceeded
past the baggage area without claiming any luggage; and (4) the respondent
changed airlines for her flight out of Detroit.
Id.
71. 446 U.S. at 548.
72. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
73. 446 U.S. at 550-51.
74. Id. at 555. Though Justice Stewart's opinion failed to garner a majority--seven
justices declined to rule that no seizure had occurred, finding that the argument had not
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Sylvia Mendenhall was an African American."
In INS v. Delgado, between twenty and thirty federal agents entered
a factory and conducted a sweep to suss out illegal aliens, and four of the
employees later filed suit, claiming that the agents lacked reasonable suspi-
cion to conduct the sweep. Invoking its "free to leave" test, the Court
rejected the claim. Never mind the fact that several agents immediately
moved throughout the factory to systematically question the employees.
Never mind the fact that the agents were armed and carried handcuffs.
Never mind the fact that other agents (presumably armed as well)
manned the exits.76 As Justice Rehnquist put it in writing for the majority,
this "could hardly result in a reasonable fear that respondents were not
free to continue working or to move about the factory" or simply leave.77
In short, they were never detained.
The employees were Hispanic.
In Florida v. Bostick, Terrance Bostick was on a Greyhound bus trav-
eling from Miami to Atlanta. At a temporary stop, the driver allowed two
police officers to board the bus and question the passengers. When the
officers reached Bostick, they asked for identification, and when this
seemed to be in order, they asked for permission to search his luggage.
Bostick consented. Drugs were found. The trial court rejected his conten-
tion that he had been detained without reasonable suspicion, he was
convicted, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Never mind that the bus
driver himself had exited, closing the door behind him, effectively leaving
the passengers stranded so that the officers could search for drugs. Never
mind that the officers were armed. Instead they said a reasonable person
would have felt free to leave.78
Terrance Bostick was African American.79
And then there's US. v. Drayton which, not surprisingly, reads like a
repeat of Bostick. Christopher Drayton and Clifton Brown, Jr. were pas-
sengers on a Greyhound bus traveling from Ft. Lauderdale to Detroit. At a
pit stop in Tallahassee, the driver allowed three plain clothes officers to
board the bus and conduct "routine" questioning of the passengers. And
when two officers got to Drayton and Brown, one of the officers-
Officer Lang--placed "his face 12-to-18 inches away from Drayton's" and
asked to check Drayton's bag.80 Finding nothing in the bag, the officer
then asked Drayton's companion Brown if he could frisk him. Brown
been properly preserved by the government-the Court adopted his articulation of the
"free to leave" test in subsequent cases.
75. Id. at 558 (identifying Mendenhall as "a female and a Negro").
76. Brief for Respondents at 3-4, INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984) No. 82-1217.
77. 466 U.S. at 220-21.
78. Although the Court in Bostick did not decide this issue, it strongly suggested that
the encounter between Bostick and the officers was not a seizure. 501 U.S. at 435.
79. Id. at 441 n. 1 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
80. 536 U.S. at 198.
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consented, drugs were found, and he was arrested. The officer then re-
turned his attention to Drayton, asking Drayton if he would consent to a
frisk. Notwithstanding that Drayton had just seen his companion arrested,
according to the record, Drayton consented as well. And drugs were
found on Drayton. And Drayton was arrested."' A detention without rea-
sonable suspicion? Of course not. Free to leave? You bet. Never mind that
one of the three officers had positioned himself at the front of the bus
near the sole exit. 2 Never mind that the officers were armed. 83 Never
mind that the bus driver, to assist the officers, had essentially rendered the
passengers immobile.
Drayton and Brown were African American.
The gravamen of my complaint is not that racial profiling oc-
curred-though certainly the evidence points in that direction.84 Nor is
my aim necessarily to weigh in on the debate about the merits of racial
profiling as a law enforcement tool or to call attention to how racial pro-
filing victimizes blacks and other people of color as a class, rendering
81. Id. at 199.
82. Id. at 197.
83. A recurring motif in the Supreme Court's free to leave cases is that the officers
did not display their weapons. But this simply does not hold water. Furthermore, it sug-
gests a type of blindness: that while officers are capable of spotting bulges under coats from
a mile away, as they frequently claim to do, a reasonable person would neither notice the
officer's bulge or holster, nor would a reasonable person assume that the officer is carrying
a weapon. Moreover, it suggests that while an officer is right to feel apprehensive about a
bulge on a citizen-hence, his authority to conduct a limited pat down under Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)-a reasonable person would feel no apprehension about seeing a
bulge, or a billy club, on a cop. This, however, is not reality. As Justice Stevens has pointed
out, in certain communities, even an innocent person may "believe[] that contact with the
police can itself be dangerous." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 132 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
with whom Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, J.,joined, dissenting).
84. Consider Mendenhall again. Even though the factors the agent identified as
prompting him to approach Mendenhall did not include her race, 446 U.S. at 547 and n.1,
it is hard to imagine that he did not notice her race or that race was not a factor. Certainly,
recent studies suggest race was likely a factor. For example, a report released by the U.S.
General Accounting Office found that black women traveling internationally were nine
times more likely than white women to be subjected to x-rays or strip searches by U.S.
Customs officials, even though they were less than half as likely to be carrying contraband.
Such targeting prompted a class action suit against officials. See Black Women Searched More,
Study Finds, N.Y TIMES, Apr. 10, 2000, at A17;John Gibeaut, Marked for Humiliation, NBA
NAT'L BAR Ass'N MAGAZINE 20, Jan./Feb. 1999; David Johnston, US. Changes Policy on
Searching Suspected Drug Smugglers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1999, at A14. Other studies have
found disproportionate targeting of black and Hispanic drivers. See, e.g., John Lamberth,
Driving While Black:A Statistician Proves that Prejudice Still Rules the Road, WASH. PosT, Aug.
16, 1998, at Cl; Michael Raphael & Kathy Barrett Carter, State Police Reveal 75% ofArrests
Along Turnpike Were of Minorities, NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, Feb. 10, 1999, at 1. For more on
the pretextual stops of Hispanics, see Victor C. Romero, Racial Profiling: "Driving While
Mexican" and Affirmative Action, 6 MICH.J. RACE & L. 195 (2000).
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them inherently suspect, burdening them with a "racial tax,"' labeling
them as second class. Finally, my point is not to simply look "beyond ra-
cial profiling" as R. Richard Banks has recently advocated. 6 Rather, my
point is to look before racial profiling. Put differently, before we can talk
racial profiling, we must talk race.
To say that the Supreme Court was blind to issues of race in these
cases is an understatement. In the majority opinions in these cases, race
either remained unstated or was mentioned only in passing. 7 But are we
really to believe that race did not play a role in the DEA agents' decision
to single out Mendenhall? Are we really to believe that race did not play a
role in the officers' singling out Bostick and Drayton for a bag search? Are
we really to believe that race did not factor into the DEA agents' decision
to ask Mendenhall to strip, or into Officer Lang placing his face "12 to 18
inches" away from Drayton's, or into the INS agents' decision to man the
factory exits? Clearly the officers in each of these cases felt empowered by
their authority, their uniforms, their badges."8 Is it too much to say that
they also likely felt empowered because of each suspect's race; and that
conversely, each suspect felt disempowered? 9 How else do we explain the
85. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 159 (1997) (describing ra-
cial profiling as burdening minorities with a "racial tax"); see also JoDY DAVID ARMOUR,
NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA
13-14 (1997) (using the term "Black Tax" to describe the burden that blacks bear as a
result of racial stereotyping).
86. See R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug War, 56 STAN.
L. REV. 571 (2003) (arguing that policymakers should abandon efforts to eliminate racial
profiling in drug interdiction because such efforts will prove futile; instead, policymakers
should focus on the race-related consequences of the war on drugs).
87. In Bostick, for example, the majority opinion never mentions Bostick's race. In
his "(E)racing the Fourth Amendment," Devon Carbado unpacks the social meaning of
this elision and how it constructs Bostick and the officers with the racial ideology of co-
lorblindness. See Devon W Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV.
946 (2002). Indeed, I am indebted to Carbado for much of my thinking about blindness
and the law.
88. Others have written on the dynamic of encounters from the perspective of the
citizen/suspect. See, e.g., Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of
Coercion, 2002 Sup. CT. REv. 153, 155 (noting that "empirical studies over the last several
decades on the social psychology of compliance, conformity, social influence, and polite-
ness have all converged on a single conclusion: the extent to which people feel free to
refuse to comply is extremely limited under situationally induced pressures" such as those
that are common in police-citizen encounters.). What I am focusing on here is the flip
side: not the vulnerability of the citizen/suspect, but the feeling of invulnerability, of being
beyond the law, that too often accompanies having a badge.
89. For example, Professor Machn has argued that "the dynamics surrounding an
encounter between a police officer and a black male are quite different from those that
surround an encounter between an officer and the so-called average, reasonable person,"
and by definition involve a degree of coercion. SeeTracey Macin, "Black and Blue Encoun-
ters"-Sone Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26
VAL. U. L. REV. 243 (1991). David Cole and Devon Carbado have also built upon this
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fact that none of these individuals-who after all knew that they were
engaged in unlawful activity, knew that they could be arrested-that none
of these individuals walked away from these so called consensual "en-
counters" that none of them declined to consent to searches? How do we
explain that these defendants, whom the Supreme Court claimed were
free to leave, did not leave?
The Supreme Court was also blind to the impact of its "free to
leave" test and Vhren on law-abiding citizens of color. The "free to leave"
test allows law enforcement officers to single out minorities for "encoun-
ters" in the hope that criminal activity will be revealed, secure in the
knowledge that minorities are less likely to feel free to leave9" and secure
in the knowledge that these encounters will remain beyond the purview
of the Fourth Amendment." The same applies to singling out minorities
for pretextual stops. Meanwhile, law-abiding citizens of color endure
these encounters continuously. The irony is that while the Supreme Court
professes to be colorblind, its decisions have essentially given law en-
forcement a green light to use criteria that is anything but colorblind in
deciding whom to question, whom to target, and whom to harass.
argument. See DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE 32 (1999); Devon W Carbado, supra note
87, at 946.
90. As Devon Carbodo points out, "people of color are socialized into engaging in
particular kinds of performance for the police." See Carbado, supra note 87. Put differently,
the burden is often different when it comes to people of color. Since they are already pre-
sumed to be guilty, or at least suspect, the burden is implicitly shifted to them to establish
their innocence. This means that a person of color who is not engaged in wrongdoing
may nonetheless consent to a search or agree to answer questions, foregoing his right to
refuse, in order to prove his innocence. On the other hand, a person of color who is en-
gaged in wrongdoing may nonetheless consent to a search or to answer questions,
foregoing his right to refuse, because he recognizes he has nothing to gain by asserting his
rights: regardless of his response, he has already been identified as guilty or suspect by vir-
tue of the pigmentation of his skin. Indeed, he may assume that he has everything to lose
by asserting his rights: As Professor Maclin puts it, "Black men know they are liable to be
stopped at [any time], and that when they question the authority of the police, the re-
sponse is often swift and violent." Maclin, supra note 89 at 253. Finally, a white person may
feel neither of these pressures, since a white person is more likely to start from the position
of presumed innocence. Moreover, a white person is more likely to feel assured (and be
reassured) that his refusal to consent or answer questions will not alter this presumption. As
the foregoing should make clear, limiting the analysis in "free to leave" cases to whether a
"reasonable person" would feel free to leave not only obscures these differences, it turns a
blind eye to them.
91. Profiling based on race is but one example, but an example where the literature
has flourished. See, e.g., David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses:
The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CriM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 560-73
(1997)(detailing stories of pretextual stops targeting African Americans and Hispanics);
Tracey Macin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REv. 333, 344-54 (1998) (ex-
amining empirical evidence that police officers target minorities for arbitrary traffic stops);
David Kocieniewski & Robert Hanley, Racial Profiling Was the Routine, New Jersey Finds,
N.YTIMEs, Nov. 28, 2000, at Al.
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When I think of these cases, I try to imagine DEA Agents singling
out a Supreme Court justice-any of them, it doesn't matter-at an air-
port.9 2 I try to imagine the agents asking the justice to accompany them
to their office, and to consent to a luggage search or a strip search. Or the
highway patrol pulling over one of the justices driving along 1-95. But the
power dynamic is all wrong, and not just because of race. There is also
gender, perceived social status, class, age. But in the end race seems to
trump all of this. In the case of the Supreme Court justice, the agents
would not dream of pulling over a justice, let alone asking for consent to
a search or consent to conduct a strip search, except maybe of Justice
Thomas. And none of the justices would dream of consenting. It's that
simple.
But back to the "free to leave" test. In Drayton, the 11th Circuit had
reversed based on its prior decisions which had adopted a simple prophy-
lactic rule: officers, before securing consent to search, give some positive
indication that consent could be refused. 93 Given that the Supreme Court
had little problem adopting the prophylactic warning announced in
Miranda94 when custodial interrogation is at issue, reconfirming Miranda in
Dickerson v. US.,9s why not adopt one where officers want to engage in a
warrantless consent search?96
The Warren Court saw that Miranda warnings were necessary in part
because of the racial dynamics of police interrogations.97 The Court today
acts blindly by pretending those dynamics do not exist.
92. I assume that the agents do not recognize the justice.
93. See United States v.Washington, 151 F3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Guapi, 144 F3d 1393 (11th Cir. 1998).
94. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
95. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
96. The Court's rejection of any warning was of course predicated on its decision in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), which held that the Fourth Amendment
requires only that consent be voluntary, not that it also be knowing, and which expressly
rejected any requirement that the subject of a search be advised of his or her right to re-
fuse consent. However, Justice Stewart's justification for rejecting this requirements is not
satisfactory. His main contention is that it "would be thoroughly impractical to impose on
the normal consent search the detailed requirement of an effective warning." Id. at 231.
But this assumes that any warning would require substantial detail, an assumption without
basis. It also disregards the fact that many officers routinely give warnings that consent is
not required. Indeed, in Bostick, the officer advised the defendant that he could refuse con-
sent. And, in Drayton, Officer Lang testified that he sometimes informed passengers of their
right to refuse to cooperate. Which begs the question: how cumbersome or impractical
could it be to require officers to advise subjects of their right to refuse consent, if many
officers provide such advice already?
97. See Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 751
(1992) (noting that "[A]n important impetus for the [Miranda] decision was the desire to
constrain the unchecked policy discretion promoting the official violence that reinforced
subjugation of the black underclass."). Indeed, a draft of the opinion expressly acknowl-
edged the racial dynamics of police interrogations. When Justice Brennan objected, the
passage referring to race was omitted from the final opinion. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ,
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In his provocative essay "Must Justice Be Blind?" Martin Jay argues
that perhaps we should reconfigure Justitia as she was depicted in the
mid-sixteenth century in the frontispiece to J. de Damhoudere's Praxi
Rerum Civilum: as having two faces:
The first has eyes that are wide open, able to discern difference,
alterity, and identity, looking in the direction of the hand that
wields her sword, while the second, facing the hand holding
the calculating scales of rule-governed impartiality, has eyes
that are veiled. For only the image of a two-faced deity, a hy-
brid, monstrous creature that we can in fact see, an allegory
that resists subsumption under a general concept, only such an
image can do, as it were, justice to the negative, even perhaps
aporetic, dialectic that entangles law and justice itself.98
The problem with Martin Jay's reconfiguration is that, in a way, we
already have a two-faced Justice. And perhaps this is the crux of the mat-
ter. It is not that Justitia is always blind. That, we could work with. It is
that her blindness is selective and practiced, especially when it comes to
matters of race. When it suits her purpose, i.e., in her agents, our law en-
forcement officers, deciding whom to pull over for a traffic stop, or whom
to target for a "consensual" encounter, she sees it. When it does not suit
her purpose, i.e., in acknowledging the racial dynamic of police encoun-
ters, or the impact its decisions will have communities of color, she turns
a blind eye, engages in something akin to conscious avoidance." This is
really my point about these cases. It is not that these defendants should
not have been prosecuted. It is not that they should never have been
stopped or questioned. Those questions go beyond the limits of this Essay.
SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND His SUPREME COURT-A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 591
(1983).
98. Martin Jay, Must Justice Be Blind? in LAw AND THE IMAGE: THE AUTHORITY OF ART
AND THE AESTHETICS OF LAW 35 (Costas Douzinas and Lynda Nead, eds., 1999).
99. A conscious avoidance charge, or "ostrich" instruction, is often appropriate in
cases where the Government must establish that the defendant had knowledge of a par-
ticular fact, and the evidence suggests that he deliberately turned a "blind eye" to avoid
knowledge of the fact. My favorite description of the charge comes from Judge Posner.
[Ostriches] do not just fail to follow through on their suspicions of bad
things.They are not merely careless birds.They bury their heads in the sand so
that they will not see or hear bad things. They deliberately avoid acquiring
unpleasant knowledge.The ostrich instruction is designed for cases in which
there is evidence that the defendant, knowing or strongly suspecting that he
is involved in shady dealings, takes steps to make sure that he does not ac-
quire full or exact knowledge of the nature and extent of those dealings. A
deliberate effort to avoid guilty knowledge is all the guilty knowledge the
law requires.
United States v. Giavannetti, 919 F2d 1223, 1228 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner,J.).
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My point is simpler: that before we can ask these larger questions, we first
need some honesty about what justice is and how it is executed. And this
means speaking honestly about justice and race.
IV
However, the issue is about more than just blindness.
In March of 1937, just a few years after Diego Rivera's infamous
mural of Lenin in Rockefeller Center, a lesser-known artist, Stefan
Hirsch, was commissioned to paint a mural for a new federal courthouse
in Aiken, South Carolina.1" Receiving little guidance from the govern-
ment, Hirsch turned to an earlier sketch he'd doneJustice as Protector and
Avenger, and in August 1938 traveled to Aiken, South Carolina to install
the painted mural onto the courtroom wall. 101 The uproar was immediate.
The federal judge called the mural a "monstrosity" and a "disgrace" and
ordered it covered." 2 To the extent the source of the offense was unclear,
the spectators in the courtroom were direct and to the point: "the central
figure, a woman representing Justice, resembled a 'mulatto.' "103 A campaign
to remove the mural kept the issue on the front pages of the Charleston
News-Courier and the Columbia State for two years.104 In the face of
claims of states' rights, calls to repaint Justice in pallid hues, and the pros-
pect of vigilante justice for Lady Justice, the government eventually gave
in.The mural was removed.0 5
I mention this incident because it suggests that Justitia has another
attribute that is rarely commented on, beyond her scales, unsheathed
sword, beyond her bandaged eyes: whiteness. Clearly the outraged South
Carolinians had been expecting a white Justitia, though they may not
have realized this beforehand. More likely, her whiteness was a given,
something assumed.
But beyond this observation, there is another reason I find this inci-
dent intriguing. To me, the incident, or rather the telling of it, contains a
gap. What were South Carolina's black residents thinking during this
100. The mural was commissioned by the Treasury Department through its Section
of Fine Arts. See KARAt ANN MARLING, WALL-TO-WALL AMERICA: A CULTURAt HISTORY OF
POsT-OFFICE MURALS IN THE GREAT DEPRESSION 30 (1982).
101. Id. at 62-64.Viewers also had trouble with the images on the left, which they
believed glorified crooks and valorized a venal public servant. Id. at 66. One image was
even interpreted as that of a "'shyster' lawyer freeing a prisoner from jail." Id. at 65 (quot-
ing from the Washington Evening Star, Sept. 27, 1938).
102. Id. at 64 (quoting from The State (Columbia, South Carolina), Sept. 27, 1938.
103. Id.
104. The NAACP even weighed in: "If judge Myers' sole objection to the mural is
the fact that the central figure is that of a person who is not white, then a new low in
judicial conduct and racial prejudice would seem to have been reached." Id. at 69.
105. Id. at 67-71.
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brouhaha? And for that matter, what were they thinking, and what do
they think today, upon encountering this metonymic image we call Justi-
tia? What does it mean, in this Manichean exchange, to "look black" not
as an object, but as a subject, as agency, as a way of looking?..6 What does
it mean to look black at an image of justice that has been figured as
white?
To most whites, the idea of whiteness is salutary, as cultural theorist
Richard Dyer lays out in his influential essay "White":
Power in contemporary society habitually passes itself off as
embodied in the normal as opposed to the superior. This is
common to all forms of power, but it works in a peculiarly se-
ductive way with whiteness, because of the way it seems
rooted, in common-sense thought, in things other than ethnic
difference.... Thus it is said (even in liberal textbooks) that
there are inevitable associations of white with light and there-
fore safety, and black with dark and therefore danger, and that
this explains racism (Whereas one might well argue about the
safety of the cover of darkness, and the danger of exposure to
the light); again, and with more justice, people point to the
Jewish and Christian use of white and black to symbolize good
and evil, as carried still in such expressions as "a black mark,"
"white magic," "to blacken the character" and so on.17
But as bell hooks has pointed out, for blacks, whiteness has historically
presented itself not as benign, but as associated with the "terrible, the ter-
rifying, the terrorizing.... To name that whiteness in the black
imagination is often a representation of terror."'0 8
In the end, our legal history supports, rather than undermines, the
view that the linkage of "white" and "justice" has not always been salu-
tary to blacks, as just a few examples illustrate. The slave codes legitimized
the institution of slavery and codified a system which granted whites carte
blanche to beat, whip, flog, brand, rape, and kill slaves and, in some in-
stances, free blacks as well.' ° The Supreme Court's Reconstruction-era
106. Again, I raise these questions because I am convinced that understanding how
the figuration of Justitia functions in our society requires more than merely recognizing
that Justitia is blind to issues of race. Understanding how Justitia functions also requires
that we ask what justice looks like in a society where embedded assumptions about race,
about the very meaningfulness of the term, appear to have an unlimited shelf life.
107. Richard Dyer, White, in 29 SCREEN, Vol. 44, 45 (1988).
108. See BELL HOOKS, BLACK LOOKS: RACE AND REPRESENTATION 170, 172 (1992).
109. See generally RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 29-36 (1997);
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME & PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 84-93 (1993). In
State v. Mann, for example, the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the conviction of
John Mann for shooting a female slave, essentially on the ground that such a conviction
would undermine the very foundation of slavery.The court acknowledged that there was a
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decisions in United States v. Cruikshank10 and Hodges v. United States"'
functioned to frustrate efforts to convict whites charged with racially mo-
tivated violence. In the face of decade upon decade of lynchings,
Congress repeatedly refused to pass federal anti-lynching legislation, a
refusal that the Senate apologized for only last year.'12 In the 1960s,J. Ed-
gar Hoover hounded civil rights leaders such as Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr., wiretapping King's phone, bugging his home and office, planting in-
formants in King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference, not out of
any sense that King was engaged in criminal activity, but out of disap-
certain "harshness" in its decision but concluded that the "power of the master must be
absolute, to render the submission of the slave perfect... The slave, to remain a slave, must
be made sensible, that there is no appeal from his master." State v. Mann, 13 N.C. 263, 267
(1829). Nor were free blacks immune from such summary punishments. For example, the
North Carolina Code of 1855 made it a crime for any free black to marry or cohabit with
a slave, or to "entertain any slave in his house" between "sunset and sunrise," or to carry a
weapon. Rev. Code N.C. 1855, chap. 107, pp. 576-77. Playing cards with a slave was also a
crime, and could subject the free black to up to "thirty-nine lashes on his bare back" or
forced servitude. N.C. Rev. Code Ch. 107 § 63, 75 (1854).
Slave laws also prohibited blacks from testifying. See THOMAS D. MoRuus, SouTm-
ERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, 1619-1860, 229-48 (1996).As one court put it:
[I]f the color is not right, the man can not testify. The truth shall not be re-
ceived from a black man, to settle a controversy where a white man is a party.
Let a man be Christian or infidel.. let him be of good character or bad; even
let him be sunk to the lowest depths of degradation; he may be a witness in
our courts if he is not black.
Jordan v. Smith, 14 Ohio 199, 201 (1846). Because federal courts adopted the rules of
evidence of the states in which they were located, blacks were often denied the ability to
testify in federal court as well. See U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Slavery and the
Treatment of Freedmen, "Equality Before the Law in the Courts of the United States," S.
Rep. No. 25,38th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1964).
110. 92 U.S. 542 (1876). Cruikshank involved the conviction of three whites-out of
a total of 97 that were indicted-pursuant to federal criminal civil rights laws in connec-
tion with the 1872 massacre in Colfax, Louisiana that resulted in the killing of
approximately 280 black residents. The Supreme Court reversed their conviction on a
variety of grounds, including the technicality that the indictment, though describing the
racial identities of the parties involved, had failed to explicitly allege that the violence was
motivated by race. For more on the Cruikshank case, see KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME & THE
LAW, supra note 108, at 50-51.
111. 203 U.S. 1 (1906) (reversing the conviction of several whites in connection with
their participation in forcing blacks out of jobs at a lumber mill under threat of violence
on the ground that the federal statute exceeded Congress's powers insofar as it proscribed
private acts).The Supreme Court did not overrule Hodges until more than 60 years later in
Jones v.Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
112. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Issues Apology Over Failure on Antilynching Law,
N.YTiMES,June 14,2005, at A15; PHILiP DiY, AT THE HANDs OF PERSONS UNKNOWN: THE
LYNCHING OF BLACK AMERICA (2001) (describing congressional opposition to passing anti-
lynching legislation or otherwise protecting blacks from white violence); and Barbara
Holden-Smith, Lynching, Federalism, and the Intersection of Race and Gender in the Progressive
Era, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 31 (1998).
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proval of King's efforts to disrupt the status quo of de jure segregation.113
Not surprisingly, even the decisions that ostensibly benefit blacks-Brown
v. Board of Education,"' for example-are occasionally viewed with skepti-
cism, as examples of the Court "saving face" or as protecting other
interests. " ' And not surprisingly, the impression left by our legal history, at
least in the minds of many blacks, is one of exclusion rather than inclu-
sion. Instead of justice as protector, our legal history suggests justice as
indifferent. Blind.
Our legal history further complicates Justitia's other rarely examined
attribute: her gender."6 Women have been victimized by the justice sys-
tem. One has only to think of our history of coverture, or of requiring
women to "follow the natural instinct of every proud female""' and resist
sexual attack "until exhausted or overpowered"" 8 in order to establish
rape (to say nothing of insulating their husbands from the charge)," 9 or
our history of indifference to issues of domestic violence. Indeed, given
our history of sanctioning the exclusion of women from the practice of
113. See generally KENNETH O'REILLY, RACIAL MATTERS: THE FBI's SECRET FILE ON
BLACK AMERICA, 1960-1972 (1989). As Randall Kennedy has pointed out, Hoover's secret
surveillance of black leaders was prompted in large part by racism and his view that any
demand by blacks for equality "tended toward treason." KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME & THE
LAW, supra note 108, at 108.
114. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
115. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARv. L. RaEV. 518 (1980).
116. This is not to suggest Justitia's gender has gone unnoticed. As Martin Jay has
observed, Justitia is unique in the depiction of women: she carries a sword, a far cry from
the maternal or sexualized images we associate with Western art. Borrowing from feminist
theorists Carol Gilligan and Seyla Benhabib, Jay suggests that the blindfold is in fact in-
separable from Justitia's gender:
Whereas male judgment tends to be abstractly universalist, decontextualized,
and formalistic, its female counterpart, [Gilligan and Benhabib] tell us, is
more frequently sensitive to particular detail, narrative uniqueness, and spe-
cific context. Instead of acknowledging only an imagined "generalized
other," it focuses on the actual "concrete other" before it.The blindfolding of
Justitia is thus not a thwarting of the gaze per se, but of the specifically fe-
male gaze, or at least of those qualities that have been associated with it in
our culture.
Jay, supra note 99 at 28-29; Recall that former Attorney General Ashcroft was so flum-
moxed by Justitia's bare breasts at the Department ofJustice that he had them covered See,
e.g., Christopher Newton, Ashcroft Loses Revealing Backdrop, CHI-SUN TIMES, Jan. 30, 2002,
at 38;Justice Has it Covered, NEWSDAY,Jan. 31, 2002, at A17.
117. State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720, 733 (1981) (Cole,J., dissenting).
118. People v. Dohring, 59 N.Y 374, 386 (1874).
119. At common law, a husband who forced his wife to engage in sex was not guilty
of rape. See 1 MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEASES OF THE CROWN 628-29 (1736);see
also Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REv.
1373 (2000).
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law,12' and from serving on juries,' and that even now we seem content
with having only one female justice on the Supreme Court, our figura-
tion ofjustice as female is more than a little ironic.
Although women have been victims of our justice system, they have
also been privileged. This is especially true in the case of white women.
Consider Muller v. Oregon,12 in which the Supreme Court upheld a law
limiting to ten hours the workday of women in factories and laundries.
Read as a case in which, through paternalism, women are both victimized
and privileged, the case should also be read as one reflecting racial prefer-
ence in the form of white privilege. After all, the Court's concern,
however misguided, that a woman's "physical structure and a proper dis-
charge of her maternal functions-having in view not merely her own
health, but the well-being of the race--justify legislation to protect her,''23 was
decidedly not with women of color, and was decidedly not with any non-
white race.'24
Again, of course women have been victimized by our justice system.
But my focus here is what it means to look through the prism of a black
male gaze at an image ofjustice that has been figured as white and female.
Viewed this way, it is impossible to consider Justitia's race and gender
without thinking of injustice. Of course, I'm referring to lynchings, many
of which were predicated on allegations of assault on "white woman-
hood." But not just our extrajudicial legal history of lynching, which was
never entirely extrajudicial in any event. Even in our "legitimate" prose-
cutions, race and gender were often determinative. Are often
determinative. One only has to consider the Scottsboro Boys case, in
which nine black youths were wrongfully convicted of raping two white
120. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873) (upholding a law that for-
bade women to practice law, noting the "natural and proper timidity and delicacy which
belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life.").
121. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (upholding a law that in effect limited
jury service to men; women could serve, but only if they specifically requested to be in-
cluded on jury lists.) Hoyt was not overruled until 1975 in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522
(1975).
122. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
123. Id. at 422 (emphasis added).
124. And this privileging continues today. Consider the attention paid to solving
crimes involving white female victims and the relative inattention paid to solving crimes
involving black female victims. It is revealing that I can name several white female victims
without giving it much thought. Nicole Brown Simpson. Natalee Holloway. Elizabeth
Smart. Laci Peterson. Chandra Levy. JonBenet Ramsey. I am unable to name a single black
female victim. Or consider the Central Park Jogger case. The case dominated the media for
months. In fact, there were 3,254 other reported rapes that year, including "one the fol-
lowing week involving the near decapitation of a black woman in Fort Tryon Park and
one two weeks later involving a black woman in Brooklyn who was robbed, raped, sod-
omized, and thrown down an air shaft of a four story building." These black women,
however, were not newsworthy.JoAN DIDION, AFTER HENRY 255 (Simon & Schuster 1992).
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women, setting off one of the most significant cases in legal history.2 1 Or
the much more recent case of the Central Park Jogger, in which "wilding"
black youths were wrongfully convicted of raping a white woman.126 Or
of the 1913 prosecution of boxing champion Jack Johnson for violating
the White Slave Traffic Act by taking a white woman across state lines on
a date.1 27 Or the recent prosecution of 18-year old Marcus Dixon on
statutory rape charges for sleeping with his white girlfriend, three months
shy of her 16th birthday.128 Or the prurient frenzy that accompanied the
prosecution of O.J. Simpson on murder charges; and the frenzy that ac-
companied the prosecution of Kobe Bryant on rape charges. And here's
the rub. All of this implicates looking.1 29 Any encounter with Justitia
125. On the Scottsboro Boys case generally, see DAN T. CRTER, SCOTTSBORO: ATIttAG-
EDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (1969).
126. For more on the Central Park Jogging case, see N.Jeremi Duru, The Central Park
Five, The Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the Bestial Black Man, 25 CAstDozo L. REV. 1315
(2004), and Susan Saulny, Convictions and Charges Voided in '89 Central Park Jogger Attack,
N.Y'IMES, Dec. 20, 2002, at Al.
127. For more on Jack Johnson generally, see Denise C. Morgan,Jack Johnson: Reluc-
tant Hero of the Black Community, 32 AKRON L. REV. 529 (1999), and GEOFFREY C. WARD,
UNFORG rvABIE BLACKNESS:THE RISE AND FALL OF JACK JOHNSON (2004).
128. Marcus was an 18-year-old high school athlete and honor student who was
prosecuted for rape, aggravated assault, false imprisonment, and sexual battery when it was
discovered that he had had sex with a 15-year-old classmate who was three months shy of
her 16th birthday. Marcus was black. She was white. Marcus was in fact adopted, his legal
guardians were white, his friends and associates were white. Still, that did not immunize
him from the "white letter" law of racial trespass. It seems that the girl, fearing that her
father would be angry if he learned that she had been with a black boy, claimed that the
sex was non-consensual. Never mind that the medical evidence of bruised arms was un-
dermined by the testimony of three classmates who said the bruises were there days before
the alleged rape. Given the option of believing the white girl or the black boy, the district
attorney believed the white girl. Although the jury of nine whites and three blacks re-
jected the charges based on non-consensual sex, they convicted Dixon of misdemeanor
statutory rape based on the evidence of consensual sex. Never mind that the misdemeanor
statutory rape law had never before been applied to two teenagers with less than three
years' age difference. Never mind that the misdemeanor statutory rape law carried a man-
datory sentence of ten years' imprisonment. By the time Georgia Supreme Court
overturned the conviction, Marcus Dixon had already served more than a year in prison.
See Ariel Hart, Child Molesting Conviction Overturned in Georgia Classmate Case, N.Y. TIMES,
May 5, 2004, at A20; Courtland Milloy, Marcus Dixon Doesn't Belong in Ga. Prison, WASH.
POST, Jan. 25, 2004, at Cl; Andrew Jacobs, Student Sex Case in George Stirs Claims of Old
South Justice, N.Y TIMEs,Jan. 22, 2004, at 14.
129. As Vron Ware put it in her pioneering study of white women and racism, "If a
black man so much as looked a white woman in the eye he risked being accused of lech-
ery or insolence, and in some cases this was as good as committing an actual assault." VRON
WARE, BEYOND THE PALE: WHITE WOMEN, RACISM, AND HISTORY 182 (1992). Cultural theo-
rist bell hooks takes the danger of looking even further, reminding us that both prior to
Emancipation and for decades afterwards, blacks "could be brutally punished for looking,
for appearing to observe the whites they were serving, as only a subject can observe, or
see" BELL HOOKS, BLACK LOOKS: RACE AND REPRESENTATION 168 (1992). Black looks
"were seen as confrontational, as gestures of resistance, challenges to authority." Id. at 115.
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comes with its own baggage, its own history, its own associations. Just by
looking, every black male is Tom Robinson to her Mayella Ewell. 3 ' Just
by looking, every black male is Bigger Thomas to her Mary Dalton. 3' Just
by looking, every black male is Willie Horton to her Single White Fe-
male. 32 To borrow from Franz Fannon, without saying a word, every black
male has already been "woven out of a thousand details, anecdotes, sto-
ries. ' 3 So has Justitia.
Because this is a personal Essay, I have asked myself what I see when
I look at Justitia and make the linkage of "white" and "justice." When I
thought along these lines, I realized that the linkage holds for me some of
the same terror the linkage of the words "black" and "crime" holds for
others. And I realized that what came to mind were images, so many that
after a while they seem to play in a continuous blur, an endless loop-d-
loop, from police beating civil rights marchers with billy clubs and batons,
to police beating Arthur McDuffie in Miami, to police beating Rodney
King in Los Angeles, to police fatally beating Nathaniel Jones in Cincin-
nati, to police beating Robert Davis in New Orleans, to police fatally
shooting Amadou Diallo and sodomizing Abner Louima in New York. Of
course, I know that only some of these incidents were caught on camera,
that purported legitimizer of truth. Little matter. The other images are
ingrained on my brain nonetheless.
The rush of images becomes more graphic when I add gender to
the equation. After all, so many lynchings were captured on camera, circu-
130. See HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960). Although the center of the
novel is arguably Scout and her father Atticus Finch, Esq., pressing at the margins are Tom
Robinson, a black man on trial for attempted rape, and Mayella Ewell, his white accuser.
Through Finch's defense of Robinson, the reader is assured of Robinson's innocence. The
jury, however, convicts.
131. See RICHARD WRIGHT, NATIVE SON (1940). 1 explore the racial and gender dy-
namics of this novel elsewhere. See Bennett Capers, The Trial of Bigger Thomas: Race, Gender,
&Trespass, 31 N.YU. REV. OF LAW & Soc. CHANGE 101 (2006).
132. Willie Horton, of course, was the convicted killer who raped a white woman
while on furlough, and whose image was used by George H.W Bush in his presidential
race against Massachusetts Governor Dukakis. The point was to depict Dukakis, who was
opposed to capital punishment, as soft on crime. And the point was made by invoking the
trope of the black rapist. As Regina Austin put it, "Willie Horton symbolized the threat
that black males, aided by white liberal politicians, pose to innocent whites. Playing on
racial fears, the ads' significance was not limited to the criminal element; every black man
was a potential Willie Horton, rapist, and murderer." See Regina Austin, Beyond Black De-
mons and White Devils:Anti-Black Conspiracy Theorizing and the Black Public Sphere, 22 FLA.
ST. U. L. Ray. 1021, 1024 (1995). For more on this appeal to race, see D. Marvin Jones,
"We're All Stuck Here for a While": Law and the Social Construction of the Black Male, 24 J. or
CoNTEMP. L. 35 (1998); Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARv. L. R-v.
413 (1999); Samuel R. Gross, Crime, Politics, and Race, 20 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'. 405
(1997).
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lated like trading cards.'-" Of course, for me, there's one image that stands
out. It's not the photograph of the mutilated body of Emmett Till, the
black 15-year old who was lynched in Mississippi for looking and whis-
tling at a white woman the year after the Supreme Court decided Brown
v. Board of Education,131 and whose lynchers were acquitted by an all-white
jury that deliberated for only an hour and seven minutes. Instead, it's the
image of Till's mother Mamie Till Mobley next to her son's mangled
body, insisting on an open-casket funeral, daring the world to look at
him.'36 To see.
These are the images that come to mind when I think ofjustice and
whiteness and gender. These images, which are part of the public con-
science, part of the public domain, and other images which, for the most
part, are purely private. That of police cars slowing down when they see
me strolling through my mostly white neighborhood. That of officers giv-
ing me that extra look. That skeptical look. That suspicious look. That
dirty look. Peggy Davis has written of law as microaggression 3 7 But that's
only part of it. Because in the end, we have done more than simply au-
thorize certain agents of justice, namely, law enforcement, to look at me
differently while other agents of justice, namely, our courts, profess to
look at me indifferently. We have authorized a system that reminds me
and reminds me: I am second-class. "8
V.
Part of me hopes that I have at least shed some light on our figura-
tion of justice. I also hope that I have at least raised serious questions
about how our figuration impacts how justice is seen. Put differently, our
conception of what will occur once we enter the hallowed halls of a
courthouse is necessarily informed by the image of justice that greets us,
that assures us equality in the eyes of the law. And I hope I have made a
persuasive argument, even through my roundabout musings, that our
134. See, e.g., JAMEs ALLEN ET AL., WITHOUT SANCTUARY: LYNCHING PHOTOGRAPHY IN
AMERICA 11 (2000).
135. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
136. For more on the murder of Emmett Till, see STEVEN J.WHITFIELD, DEATH IN THE
DELTA: THE STORY OF EMMETT TILL (1988).
137. Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE UJ. 1559 (1989). Similarly, see
Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the Law's
Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127 (1987) (describing the invisible lacerations
suffered by victims of racism).
138. Professor Maclin, without expressly invoking race, makes a similar argument:
"the Court sees the typical Fourth Amendment claimant as a second-class citizen," and
that this perception "may explain the Court's reluctance to subject police conduct to vig-
orous judicial oversight." Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35
WM & MARY L. REv. 197,238 (1993).
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figuration of justice also tells us a lot about how justice functions. How
we allow it to function.
Another part of me merely hopes that in giving voice to those who
lack voices, or at least pulpits, I have been true. And that's because when I
gaze at Justitia, I'm not gazing as a black defendant in a justice system, or
as even a black youth for whom suspicionless stops are a way of life. In-
stead, my gaze is that of a black academic, and before that as a black
prosecutor. When I write about justice, speak about justice, I do so not
from the outside, but from a privileged, if still not entirely comfortable,
position on the inside. This is my hope: that in theorizing about justice, I
have not forgotten where I've from, where I've been, and that I carry
proudly my mark of blackness.139
Still, I linger in front of Justitia. I recall the lines from Langston
Hughes's poem "Justice":
That Justice is a blind goddess
Is a thing to which we blacks are wise.
Her bandage hides two festering sores
That once perhaps were eyes. 4'
But are there sores there? After all, her eyes have not been gouged.
Nor is her blindness congenital. She does not suffer from amaurosis. Nor
does she, like one of Oliver Sacks's patients, suffer from agnosia, hysterical
blindness. We need not wring our hands pondering the etiology of her
condition. It's only a veil over her eyes. And who's to say a veil can't be
removed?
The challenge for those of us concerned with making our criminal
justice system fair is two-fold.We must eliminate actual unfairness, and we
must eliminate the perception of unfairness. But a personification of jus-
tice as blind does neither. Indeed, it has the contrary result. In actuality,
her blindness perpetuates unfairness by turning a blind eye to what eve-
ryone else sees: that "there is no exit from race. 141 And in perception, her
blindness comes across as selective, studied, and self-serving. In short, as
anything but just. And of course, this is only exacerbated by her raced
body, by her gendered body.
In the end, this is my hope. That one day, we will desex her. That
one day, we will derace her. And that we will begin with this first step:
removing her blindfold. Only then will she see how her scales are tipped,
139. Of course, the mark of blackness is usually viewed as stigmatic. See, e.g., Robin
A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, & Equality, 78 N.YU. L. Rv. 803
(2004). What I am suggesting here are other associations, including that of responsibility
and ownership.
140. LANGSTON HUGHES, "Justice," in A NEW SONG (1938).
141. I'm indebted to Professor Carbado for this turn of phrase. See Carbado, supra
note 87 at 996.
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and see what havoc she's wrought with her sword. And maybe, just maybe,
in seeing, justice too will be transformed.

